Rabbie逸事之劫匪

       是日艳阳高照，气温颇高。rabbie和我出门去图书馆借书，走到KFC门口时，rabbie满脸憧憬地抬头望了望里面的花花世界，眼珠一转便开始高声嚎叫作中暑状，cos林黛玉立足不稳头晕脑胀，仿佛下一秒钟就会立扑，同时颤颤巍巍地表示天气过热，需要诸如KFC甜筒冰淇淋等苦口良药来治疗突发性中暑昏厥症，并且事不宜迟需火速执行，否则性命堪虞（热得还是馋得？）。

       于是无奈，用我钱包换你热情的笑容。拿着甜筒的rabbie春光满面得意洋洋坐在KCF沙发上，开心得花枝乱颤，全无一分钟前楚楚可怜的白毛女风范。三下五除二解决掉自己手里的甜筒后，rabbie又有惊人之举，一把把我手上才吃了一半的甜筒夺了过来，继续大快朵颐。

       “你…你…要干什么？”受害者yyz气得浑身发抖，直想打110报警。

       “什么干什么？吃甜筒阿”劫匪对我的弱智问题表示充分鄙视，口气强硬随反问了一句，随即继续专注于甜筒歼灭工程，“唏流”又是一大口。我这个心痛啊。

       “可…可这是我的…”“罗嗦什么，本姑娘吃你的甜筒是你的福分！！”话还没说完，就被劫匪恶狠狠地打断了。

       欲哭无泪。真个秀才遇到兵有理说不清了。“谁规定你骗了我一个甜筒冰淇淋，吃完后还要把我剩下的也拿走？？”

       “我…”劫匪满嘴冰淇淋，说话支吾不清，只勉强挤出这么一个还能听懂的音符。

       “我抗议！！立法和行政职能不分，这不公平！”眼见最后一块残骸被塞进rabbie的血盆大口中，我心如刀绞，大声疾呼。但无奈木已成舟生米已成了熟饭，进了她嘴的甜筒已是无论如何回不来了。呜呼哀哉，我只好退而求其次，转而呼吁建立三权分立相互制衡的民主政体了。

       能吃的已经全塞进口腔，劫匪rabbie于是收敛起狰狞面孔，慢慢悠悠心安理得地细嚼慢咽起来，一边幸灾乐祸地向我示威，待最后一口战利品“咕咚”从口腔运动到胃里后，劫匪一脸陶醉，气定神闲地用纸巾擦擦嘴，冲我说：“三权分立是什么？”

       为了在我家建立起开明民主自由的现代政治体制，进而实现和谐社会的宏伟构想，我不得不以尽可能通俗易懂的语言向这位只有武力没有大脑、未敦教化的野蛮人解释：就是一位姓孟的法国同学说过的，立法、司法、行政三种权力应该独立且相互制约，比如在中国…“

       “我知道我知道！”劫匪rabbie刚刚吃了一个半甜筒，摄入糖分过多，为了迅速消耗多余热量避免脂肪堆积，以及捎带着show一下自己的渊博学识，伊急急打断我的话，抢着说：“在中国立法权归国务院，司法权归中央，行政权么——当然归公安局啦！！！”

       谨以此文悼念我沦落敌手、未得全尸而终的半个甜筒冰淇淋。

                            7月27日 2005

socialist society founded in 1883–84 in London, having as its goal the establishment of a democratic socialist state in Great Britain. The Fabians put their faith in evolutionary socialism rather than in revolution. The name of the society is derived from the Roman general Fabius Cunctator, whose patient and elusive tactics in avoiding pitched battles secured his ultimate victory over stronger forces. Its founding is attributed to Thomas Davidson, a Scottish philosopher, and its early members included George Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb, Annie Besant, Edward Pease, and Graham Wallas. Shaw and Webb, later joined by Webb’s wife, Beatrice, were the outstanding leaders of the society for many years. In 1889 the society published its best-known tract, Fabian Essays in Socialism, edited by Shaw. It was followed in 1952 by New Fabian Essays, edited by Richard H.S. Crossman. The Fabians at first attempted to permeate the Liberal and Conservative parties with socialist ideas, but later they helped to organize the separate Labour Representation Committee, which became the Labour Party in 1906. The Fabian Society has since been affiliated with the Labour Party. The national membership of the Fabian Society has never been very great (at its peak in 1946 it had only about 8,400 members), but the importance of the society has always been much greater than its size might suggest. Generally, a large number of Labour members of Parliament in the House of Commons, as well as many of the party leaders, are Fabians; and in addition to the national society, there are scores of local Fabian societies. The principal activities of the society consist in the furtherance of its goal of socialism through the education of the public along socialist lines by means of meetings, lectures, discussion groups, conferences, and summer schools; carrying out research into political, economic, and social problems; and publishing books, pamphlets, and periodicals. In 1931 the New Fabian Research Bureau was established as an independent body. The bureau and the society amalgamated in 1938 to form a new and revitalized Fabian Society. In 1940 the Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society was established, and it produced a continuous stream of discussion and writing on colonial questions. The Fabian International Bureau was started in 1941 to cater to the growing concern of Fabians with foreign policy and the great issues of war and peace. Copyright © 1994-2002 Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.

    卖者争夺买者的手段通常包括：
        a.价格变化（价格竞争）
        b.抱着吸引更多忠诚用户的目的改良产品（针对对价格不那么敏感的消费者），投入R&D成本
        c.广告。付出额外交易成本为自己谋求市场地位。
        d.销售组织建设，如分销渠道等。
        e.对消费者的融资支持，如贷款、分期付款等。
        f.售后服务。
        g.对竞争施加政治性游说。
   
    其中a-f属于经济型竞争，a为价格竞争，b-f为非价格竞争；g为非经济竞争，供应者串通政府强制或限制买家的干预。（新古典教科书大都忽视b-f的非价格竞争，而假定零令交易成本的市场行为。）
   
    新制度经济学分析现实经济活动后认为，新古典主义经济学的完全竞争市场假设是不正确的。市场通常状态都是一个非完全竞争的寡头垄断市场，几个供应商之间彼 此熟悉而共同争取客户，从而存在寡头竞争的情况。其中供应者往往通过b-f的非价格竞争手段部分的培养消费者对它们产品的忠诚度，从而在一定的价格范围 内，该供应商面对的价格需求弹性相当之小，以至于可以忽略不计，并因而使他的需求曲线出现两个拐折点（关于拐折的需求曲线，请参照保罗斯威齐的原始论 述）。如在图中所示，当价格在P1P2之间时，企业的需求曲线E1E2的弹性非常之小，企业进入适合生存发展的市场小生境(market niche）之中。在市场小生境范围内，价格的变动对需求量产生的影响很小，只要企业能够有效控制成本不出现大的决策失误，使得成本始终盘踞在P1P2之 间，从而可以在相当程度上弥补企业因决策失误带来的成本损失并尽可能转嫁到消费者头上去。因而企业总是想方设法进入这个市场小生境范围内并盘踞下来。影响 市场小生境的外部力量主要有：来自其他供应商的竞争会给这个企业的小生境造成压力，进一步缩小|p1p2|的值，从而降低该企业的利润；相应地，通过g （政府游说，即寻租活动，通过向政府谋求政治干预来保护其市场小生境）的非经济手段，与b-f的非价格竞争一起发挥作用，也可以带来提到|p1p2|的动 态张力。压力和张力此消彼长不断变化，使得整个经济活动呈现不停的动态流动。残酷的市场竞争中也因而不断涌现出新的知识，带动社会向前发展。
   
    消费者会欢迎这种结果，充分竞争将带来更大的效用和更多地满足，以使购买者付出更少的钱获得更大的效益。供应者则会感到更大的压力，从而被逼着不断寻求新的知识和信息，以确保在市场竞争中至少不会落于人后，保住既有的市场份额。

in philosophy, system of right or justice held to be common to all humankind and derived from nature rather than from the rules of society, or positive law. Throughout the history of the concept, there have been disagreements over the meaning of naturallaw and over its relation to positive law.

Aristotle held that what was “just by nature” was not always the same as what was “just by law”; that there was a natural justice valid everywhere with the same force and “not existing by people’s thinking this or that”; and that appeal could be made to it from the positive law. He drew his instances of the natural law, however, chiefly from his observation of the Greeks in their city-states, with their subordination of women to men, of slaves to citizens, and of barbarians to Hellenes. The Stoics, on the other hand, conceived an entirely egalitarian law of nature in conformity with the “right reason,” or Logos, inherent in the human mind. The Roman jurists paid lip service to this notion, and St. Paul seems to reflect it when he writes of a law “written in the hearts” of the Gentiles (Romans 2:14–15).

St. Augustine of Hippo took up the Pauline mention and developed the idea of man having lived freely under the natural law before his fall and his subsequent bondage under sin and the positive law. Gratian in the 11th century simply equated the naturallaw with the divine law, that is, with the revealed law of the Old and the New Testament, in particular the Christian version of the Golden Rule.

St. Thomas Aquinas propounded an influential systematization. The eternal law of the divine reason, he maintained, though it is unknowable to us in its perfection as it is in God’s mind, is yet known to us in part not only by revelation but also by the operations of our reason. The law of nature, which is “nothing else than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature,” thus comprises those precepts that humankind is able to formulate, namely, the preservation of one’s own good, the fulfillment of “those inclinations which nature has taught to all animals,” and the pursuit of the knowledge of God. Human law must be the particular application of the natural law.

Other scholastic philosophers, for instance John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and, especially, Francisco Suárez, emphasized the divine will instead of the divine reason as the source of law. This “voluntarism” influenced the Roman Catholic jurisprudence of the Counter-Reformation, but the Thomistic doctrine was later revived and reinforced to become the main philosophical ground for the papal exposition of natural right in the social teaching of Leo XIII and his successors.

The epoch-making appeal of Hugo Grotius to the natural law belongs to the history of jurisprudence. But whereas his fellow Calvinist Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) had proceeded from theological doctrines of predestination to elaborate his theory of lawnatural law “even if we were to suppose . . . that God does not exist or is not concerned with human affairs.” A few years later Thomas Hobbes was arguing not from the “state of innocence” in which man had lived in the biblical Eden but from a savage “state of nature” in which men, free and equal in rights, were each one at solitary war with every other. After discerning the right of nature (jus naturale) to be “the liberty each man hath to use his own power for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of life,” Hobbes defines a law of nature (lex naturalis) as “a precept of general rule found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life” and then enumerates the elementary rules on which peace and society can be established. Grotius and Hobbes thus stand together at the head of that “school of natural law” which, in accordance with the tendencies of the Enlightenment, tried to construct a whole edifice of law by rational deduction from a fictitious “state of nature” followed by a social contract. In England, John Locke departed from Hobbesian pessimism to the extent of describing the state of nature as a state of society, with free and equal men already observing the natural law. In France, where Montesquieu had argued that natural laws were presocial and were superior to those of religion and of the state, Jean-Jacques Rousseau postulated a savage who was virtuous in isolation and actuated by two principles “prior to reason,” self-preservation and compassion (innate repugnance against the sufferings of others). binding on all peoples, Grotius insisted on the validity of the

The Declaration of Independence of the United States refers only briefly to “the Laws of Nature” before citing equality and other “unalienable” rights as “self-evident.” The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen asserts liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression as “imprescriptible natural rights.” The philosophy of Immanuel Kant renounced the attempt to know nature as it really is, yet allowed the practical or moral reason to deduce a valid system of right with its own purely formal framework; and Kantian formalism contributed to the 20th-century revival of naturalistic jurisprudence.

On the level of international politics in the 20th century, the assertion of human rights was the product rather of an empirical search for common values than of any explicit doctrine about a natural law.

in philosophy, system of right or justice held to be common to all humankind and derived from nature rather than from the rules of society, or positive law. Throughout the history of the concept, there have been disagreements over the meaning of naturallaw and over its relation to positive law.

Aristotle held that what was “just by nature” was not always the same as what was “just by law”; that there was a natural justice valid everywhere with the same force and “not existing by people’s thinking this or that”; and that appeal could be made to it from the positive law. He drew his instances of the natural law, however, chiefly from his observation of the Greeks in their city-states, with their subordination of women to men, of slaves to citizens, and of barbarians to Hellenes. The Stoics, on the other hand, conceived an entirely egalitarian law of nature in conformity with the “right reason,” or Logos, inherent in the human mind. The Roman jurists paid lip service to this notion, and St. Paul seems to reflect it when he writes of a law “written in the hearts” of the Gentiles (Romans 2:14–15).

St. Augustine of Hippo took up the Pauline mention and developed the idea of man having lived freely under the natural law before his fall and his subsequent bondage under sin and the positive law. Gratian in the 11th century simply equated the naturallaw with the divine law, that is, with the revealed law of the Old and the New Testament, in particular the Christian version of the Golden Rule.

St. Thomas Aquinas propounded an influential systematization. The eternal law of the divine reason, he maintained, though it is unknowable to us in its perfection as it is in God’s mind, is yet known to us in part not only by revelation but also by the operations of our reason. The law of nature, which is “nothing else than the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature,” thus comprises those precepts that humankind is able to formulate, namely, the preservation of one’s own good, the fulfillment of “those inclinations which nature has taught to all animals,” and the pursuit of the knowledge of God. Human law must be the particular application of the natural law.

Other scholastic philosophers, for instance John Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and, especially, Francisco Suárez, emphasized the divine will instead of the divine reason as the source of law. This “voluntarism” influenced the Roman Catholic jurisprudence of the Counter-Reformation, but the Thomistic doctrine was later revived and reinforced to become the main philosophical ground for the papal exposition of natural right in the social teaching of Leo XIII and his successors.

The epoch-making appeal of Hugo Grotius to the natural law belongs to the history of jurisprudence. But whereas his fellow Calvinist Johannes Althusius (1557–1638) had proceeded from theological doctrines of predestination to elaborate his theory of lawnatural law “even if we were to suppose . . . that God does not exist or is not concerned with human affairs.” A few years later Thomas Hobbes was arguing not from the “state of innocence” in which man had lived in the biblical Eden but from a savage “state of nature” in which men, free and equal in rights, were each one at solitary war with every other. After discerning the right of nature (jus naturale) to be “the liberty each man hath to use his own power for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of life,” Hobbes defines a law of nature (lex naturalis) as “a precept of general rule found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life” and then enumerates the elementary rules on which peace and society can be established. Grotius and Hobbes thus stand together at the head of that “school of natural law” which, in accordance with the tendencies of the Enlightenment, tried to construct a whole edifice of law by rational deduction from a fictitious “state of nature” followed by a social contract. In England, John Locke departed from Hobbesian pessimism to the extent of describing the state of nature as a state of society, with free and equal men already observing the natural law. In France, where Montesquieu had argued that natural laws were presocial and were superior to those of religion and of the state, Jean-Jacques Rousseau postulated a savage who was virtuous in isolation and actuated by two principles “prior to reason,” self-preservation and compassion (innate repugnance against the sufferings of others). binding on all peoples, Grotius insisted on the validity of the

The Declaration of Independence of the United States refers only briefly to “the Laws of Nature” before citing equality and other “unalienable” rights as “self-evident.” The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen asserts liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression as “imprescriptible natural rights.” The philosophy of Immanuel Kant renounced the attempt to know nature as it really is, yet allowed the practical or moral reason to deduce a valid system of right with its own purely formal framework; and Kantian formalism contributed to the 20th-century revival of naturalistic jurisprudence.

On the level of international politics in the 20th century, the assertion of human rights was the product rather of an empirical search for common values than of any explicit doctrine about a natural law.

also called Hansa, German Hanse, organization founded by north German towns and German merchant communities abroad to protect their mutual trading interests. The league dominated commercial activity in northern Europe from the 13th to the 15th century. (Hanse was a medieval German word for “guild,” or “association,” derived from a Gothic word for “troop,” or “company.”) Northern German mastery of trade in the Baltic Sea was achieved with striking speed and completeness in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. After its capture by Henry the Lion in 1158, Lübeck became the main base for Westphalian and Saxon merchants expanding northward and eastward; Visby, on the Swedish island of Gotland, was soon established as a major transshipment centre for trade in the Baltic and with Novgorod, which was the chief mart for the Russian trade. From Visby, German merchants helped establish important towns on the east coast of the Baltic: Riga, Reval (now Tallinn), Danzig (now Gdansk), and Dorpat (now Tartu). Thus, by the early 13th century Germans had a near-monopoly of long-distance trade in the Baltic. In the meantime, merchants from Cologne (Köln) and other towns in the Rhineland had acquired trading privileges in Flanders and in England. The decisive steps in the formation of the Hanseatic League took place in the second half of the 13th century. While overseas, the German merchants had tended increasingly to form associations (“hanses”) with each other in order to secure common action against robbers and pirates. From the mid-13th century this cooperation became much more extensive and regularized, and by 1265 all the north German towns having the “law of Lübeck” had agreed on common legislation for the defense of merchants and their goods. In the 1270s a Lübeck-Hamburg association that had acquired trading privileges in Flanders and England united with its rival Rhenish counterpart, and in the 1280s this confederation of German merchants trading in the west was closely joined to the association trading in the Baltic, thus creating the Hanseatic League. The Hanseatic League attempted to protect its ship convoys and caravans by quelling pirates and brigands, and it fostered safe navigation by building lighthouses and training pilots. Most importantly, it sought to organize and control trade throughout northern Europe by winning commercial privileges and monopolies and by establishing trading bases overseas. The league established permanent commercial enclaves (Kontore) in a number of foreign towns, notably Bruges in Flanders, Bergen in Norway, Novgorod in Russia, and the Steel Yard in London. The league’s principal trade consisted of grain, timber, furs, tar, honey, and flax traded from Russia and Poland to Flanders and England, which in turn sent cloth and other manufactured goods eastward to the Slavs. Swedish copper and iron ore were traded westward, and herring caught off the southern tip of Sweden was traded throughout Germany southward to the Alps. The Hanseatic League’s aggressively protectionist trading practices often aroused opposition from foreign merchants. The league typically used gifts and loans to foreign political leaders to protect its commercial privileges, and when this proved inadequate, it threatened to withdraw its trade and occasionally became involved in embargoes and blockades. Only in extreme cases did the league engage in organized warfare, as in the 1360s, when it faced a serious challenge from the Danish king Valdemar IV, who was trying to master the southwestern Baltic and end the league’s economic control there. The league’s members raised an armed force that defeated the Danes decisively in 1368, and in the Peace of Stralsund (1370) Denmark was forced to recognize the league’s supremacy in the Baltic. In the 14th century the Hanseatic League claimed a membership of about 100 towns, mostly German. Though basically a mercantile rather than a political organization, the league tried to ensure peace and order at home; warfare between member towns, civic strife within towns, and robbery on the roads were all suppressed as far as possible. The league had no constitution and no permanent army, navy, or governing body except for periodic assemblies (diets). These were convened less and less frequently from the early 15th century, as the towns’ peculiar and regional interests began to outweigh their common concerns. The Hanseatic League declined partly because it lacked any centralized power with which to withstand the new and more powerful nation-states forming on its borders. Lithuania and Poland were united in 1386; Denmark, Sweden, and Norway formed a union in 1397; and Ivan III of Moscow closed the Hanseatic trading settlement at Novgorod in 1494. The Dutch were growing in mercantile and industrial strength, and in the 15th century they were able to oust German traders from Dutch domestic markets and the North Sea region as a whole. New maritime connections between the Baltic and Mediterranean seas and between the Old World and the Americas caused a gradual diversion of trade westward to the great Atlantic ports. By the mid-16th century, Dutch ships had even won control of the carrying trade from the Baltic to the west, dealing a serious blow to Lübeck. The league died slowly as England contested with the Netherlands for dominance in northern European commerce and Sweden emerged as the chief commercial power in the Baltic Sea region. The Hanseatic League’s diet met for the last time in 1669.

    “生产职能的计划工作包括产品计划、设施计划和供应商选择计划等三方面的内容。……”
    这种类型的话从小就让我很郁闷。如果已经明确列出三方面的内容了，为什么还要用“等”字；如果要突出“等”，为什么还要在后边画蛇添足加上“三”的数词？
    （《高级管理学》，尤建新等著，同济大学出版社，2003年11月）

    下午坐406公交车回家，车身内贴满一所英语培训学校的广告，吹嘘已有10万名学员亲身体验证实，经过该校的独特英语教学法培训后，熟练掌握80万词汇量 的英语读写听说只需要8天时间，并经由人民日报、中国青年报、疯狂英语杂志等媒体做全面详细报道云云。读过这则大字报我就只好当场晕菜了，看来这么多年的 英语终于还是白念，按这么努力从小到大学了10多年的abc，词汇量也不敢说就有10万，更别说熟练的掌握听说能力了。这个学校能用8天时间让学生满嘴地 道鸟语，乖乖龙的东，我这书读得实在失败，不如退学不要这研究生文凭，入他的英语班吧。
    ps.这个“多家媒体的全面报道”也未免吹嘘得太无耻了点：花点钱在人家报纸的末版尾版打个毫不起眼的小广告，回头就可以吹嘘自己神乎其神，甚至惊动那么多家大媒体来主动采访跟踪报道，厚颜无耻的学校还有没有职业道德可言？

    任何社会活动都不可能是完全“理性”地严格遵照经济原则做出的，都不可避免受到社会政治、风俗文化、伦理道德等因素的影响。比如中东地区对妇女参加工作融 入社会生活的一系列习俗性限制，在比如中国五、六十年代禁止农民自家养鸡、禽畜等。因而脱离具体的制度背景空谈过分空洞的普适性经济原则就显得较不恰当， 以及，绝对的经济自由在实践中不仅不可能实现，理论上也没有过分强求的必要性。

   初恋说她现在西安出差。说项目进展地不错。说今晚还要陪客户喝酒。说妈的我明明是个搞IT的却怎么混得好像坐台小姐似的。初恋只是不说她是怎么打听到我的网号的，以及为什么又会突然间找我聊天。 伊脾气古怪地一如既往，滔滔不绝又绝不会说她不想说的，话题一而再地岔开，我料定撬出答案的努力又属枉然。
   于是穷侃吧，这个我擅长。初恋似乎有话要说却总是欲言又止。你现在好吗快毕业了吧打算干什么。好啊你还那么小再读几年又何妨。我一切还好只是工作很累。呸 你想说我胖就直说别拐弯抹角的。本姑娘不稀罕。 项目完工了我就回沈阳。
   来来往往，我只是说不清脑子里初恋的影像是更清晰了抑或更反之，只是再不愿相信“我还好”之类的鬼话——和其他人一样这只是无话可说时的托词，大多数时候 我们都麻木机械地过活，仿佛被骟掉的猪，只知埋头吃睡拉撒，以及追求“成功”。
   初恋想问的问题其实很多，我知道她犹豫着的只是怎么说出口。曾经彼此再熟悉不过的老朋友，断了几年音信后，也开始打着哈哈，共同陷入无话不说的沉默了。
   现在想来当年的故事其实很简单：说不上谁犯了错误，不疼不痒无伤大雅，但偏偏那是个我们都愿意死去活来的年纪。于是一切都无可挽回，只有在六七年后天各一 方，对着显示器键盘闲叙天宝事了。不同的只是懊悔的程度不一，以及，再也无从知道当年的“如果”到了今天，又会是何般田地。

   于是继续无话不说的沉默。
   于是初恋说：“失陪了范老师我得去坐台”。 于是一切又变回了老样子，半死不活，各忙各的。